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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, REASON, AND 
REVELATION IN TWO CLASSICAL 
HINDU THEOLOGIES 
Francis X. Clooney, S.J. 
This essay introduces central features of classical Hindu reflection on the exis-
tence and nature of God by examining arguments presented in the 
Nyayamaiijarl of Jayanta Bhatta (9th century CE), and the Nyayasiddhaiijana 
of Vedanta Desika (14th century CE). Jayanta represents the Nyaya school of 
Hindu logic and philosophical theology, which argued that God's existence 
could be known by a form of the cosmological argument. Vedanta Desika rep-
resents the Vedanta theological tradition, which denied that God's existence 
could be known by reason, gave primacy to the revelatory texts known as the 
Upanii;>ads, and firmly subordinated theological reasoning to the acceptance of 
revelation. Jayanta and Desika are respected representatives of their traditions 
whose clear, systematic positions illumine traditional Hindu understandings of 
"God" and the traditional Hindu debates about Cod's existence and nature. 
Attention to their positions highlights striking common features shared by 
Hindu and Christian theologies, and offers a substantial basis for comparative 
reflection on the Christian understanding of God's existence and nature, and 
the roles of reason and revelation in knowledge of God. 
The Arrival of the Question of God as a Subject of Debate ill Hindu India 
Before turning to Jayanta Bhatta and Vedanta Desika, it is important 
first to understand how the existence and nature of God became an urgent 
question in India. Let us therefore first consider a few features of the intel-
lectual climate in which the Nyaya and Vedanta theologians (henceforth, 
respectively, the Naiyayikas and Vedantins) had to expound their views 
on God. Nyaya and Vedanta theologies and arguments about the existence 
of God develop within a complex religious environment which had as its 
most prominent established feature a worldview rooted in the authority of 
the Sanskrit-language Vedas and the ritual practices closely connected with 
the Veda. In the ritually-described world of the Vedas, many gods were 
recognized and invoked and no one god could be said to reign supreme 
and unchallenged. In this environment, two challenges to the tradition 
were key in helping to provoke explicit debate about the existence of God, 
one theistic and the other its opposite. 
On the one side there was the persistent and growing tendency in the 
wider Hindu culture, popular and intellectual, toward theism and even de 
facto monotheism, in particular the worship of major deities such as Siva 
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and Vi!?l).u (who was worshipped as Rama and Kr!?l).a in particular). Even 
as the older pantheon of gods related to the Vedic rituals lost favor, at least 
in the wider popular imagination, these new major deities were increasing-
ly figures of substance, whom intellectuals had to take into account. The 
issue was not solely the achievement of a higher or more refined religious 
discourse. The ritual system itself was highly sophisticated, while a key 
alternative to the primacy of ritual practice had already developed in the 
Vedic tradition, i.e., in the Upani!?adic discovery of brahman as the perva-
sive spiritual power underlying all reality, and of atman as the innermost 
self of all living beings; this focus on the Self took a potent intellectual form 
in the schools of VedaI}ta, particular with the great theologians Badarayal)a 
(5th century CE) and Saqlkara, the articulator of Nondualist Vedanta (7th-
8th century CE). 
In this context where both ritual practice and the discovery of self 
would be recognized as coherent and sufficient centers for religious world-
views, it would not be obvious or uncontested that there should be a God 
posited at and as the center of religious intelligibility. Yet theism - as the 
focus on a single, supreme God - proved itself to be a strong competitor to 
the ritual and nondualist alternatives, and texts like the Bhagavad Gfta 
(2nd century BCE) stated the case for theism in a compelling fashion. 
Intellectual systems like Nyaya and Vedanta - which could function with-
out such theism - nevertheless had to find ways of addressing theistic con-
cerns and incorporating theistic values. 
But at the same time this tendency to theistic reconstructions of religion 
were counterbalanced by strong forces tending toward atheism or, at least, 
rejections of the idea that positing the existence of a supreme God is neces-
sary in order to render the world intelligible. Here, as in many other areas 
of Hindu thought, the Buddhist arguments are crucial. Thinkers like 
Dignaga and Dharmakrrti brought a wide range of epistemological, logical, 
and linguistic issues into sharp focus, and their writings highlighted the 
intellectual bases for their fundamental religious concern - the identifica-
tion of Gautama, the Buddha, as the omniscient, gracious savior. Since the 
Buddhist positions are amply discussed elsewhere in this issue of the jour-
nal, I will not rehearse them here, and will emphasize only that to under-
stand properly the earlier (pre-l 000 CE) Hindu understandings of God one 
must keep in mind the Buddhist critiques of the idea of God and the 
Buddhist alternatives to God-language. 
The other major strand of critique against explanatory theism and the 
project of formulating an induction of God's existence came from within 
the orthodox world. The school of ritual analysis and interpretation known 
as Mlmaqlsa, which dates back at least to the early centuries BCE, presents 
us with an orthodox brahmanical rejection of the idea of a God who is 
world-maker and Veda-author. Although the MimalT1sa thinkers (hence-
forth Mirnaqlsakas) were pragmatists who argued for the intelligibility and 
coherence of the ritual worldview and were disinclined to debate cosmo-
logical and theological issues, they could not control the discussion about 
religious issues in ancient India. In the face of competing candidates for 
ultimate religious meaning, they too had to take up and discuss ideas 
about God - God as the author of the Vedic scriptures, creator of the 
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world, recipient of all worship - even if such issues and the discussion 
itself were not really amicable to the Mlmarpsa system. To elude the 
advent of a God as the guarantor of meaning, the Mimarpsakas grudgingly 
dealt with more extended layers and levels of theological reasoning, taking 
up the question of God in a variety of intellectual settings, beginning with 
the ritual and linguistic, and continuing to the cosmological and logical. In 
all these intellectual contexts, Mimarpsa resisted conceding to theism an 
intellectual and explanatory role. 
The earliest Mimarpsa position on God was simple disinterest. The 
Piirva Mimi'ilpsa SL1tras of Jaimini (2ryd century BCE) and the first com-
mentary on the Siitras, the Bha$ya of Sabara (1st century CE), stand at the 
start of the textual tradition of Mimarpsa. They seem to have been largely 
uninterested in cosmology and cosmogony and the clarification of meta-
physical presuppositions. Neither elaborates a theory about how the world 
came to be, and neither addresses the issue of whether there is or needs to 
be a God. Jaimini and Sabara give only minimal evidence for what will 
become, later on, the developed Mimarpsa position on God. At various 
points in the Siitras, however, the claims they do make serve implicitly to 
undercut the attribution of substantial reality to either gods or God, by 
constructing complete explanations which do not require the postulation of 
a Being outside the closed ritual world. Their counterposition was put for-
ward largely in terms of how language works; the coherence of the Vedic 
system is justified internally according to the dynamics of language learn-
ing and interpretati<;n, such that external appeals are judged unnecessary. 
On the basis of Sabara's views there developed two important schools 
of Mimarpsa, one traceable to the teachings of Prabhakara Misra (7th-8th 
century), and the other to those of Kumarila Bhatta (7th century). Thinkers 
in the less influential though perhaps more traditional Prabhakara school 
defended the self-sufficiency of sacrifice and the non-necessity of positing a 
God largely on linguistic grounds: language-learning is simply a process of 
juniors learning from their seniors, and there is no need to posit a maker of 
the relationship between words and meanings; analogously, there is no 
need to posit a world-maker. 
In the more dominant school of Kumarila Bhatta, the non-theistic posi-
tion is developed on linguistic grounds and also in regard to cosmological 
issues. In elucidating Sabara's commenta}"y on Jaimini's siitra 1.1.5, 
Kumarila devotes a series of sections of his Slokavartika to topics directly 
or indirectly related to language, word, and referent. He engages a series of 
positions - including Buddhist arguments - which threaten the 
Mimarpsa understanding of linguistic reference and the nature of reality 
(the referent). He defends Mimarpsa's realist understanding of the world 
as a self-sufficient whole. 
In a key section known as the Sambandhak$epaparihara ("The deflec-
tion of the criticisms of the [innate] relationship [between words and mean-
ings]"), Kumarila refutes the view that the word-meaning relation is con-
ventional. He seeks to show that there is no convincing way to explain the 
beginning of that relationship; rather, it is simply given, knowable and 
usable, without having been created by any particular maker. Kumarila 
devotes the middle part of the Sambandhak$epaparihara to refuting the 
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idea of a supreme God, since such a God, were one to exist, would also be 
the prime candidate for the roles of guarantor of language in general and 
of composer of the Vedic scriptures in particular. But Kumarila rejects the 
idea of God also for a series of more philosophical reasons, including these: 
a. the idea of a world-maker is not viable, since one cannot conceive how 
such a person would make a world, or why; b. the widely accepted idea 
that creations and dissolutions are periodic is hard to reconcile with the 
idea of a perfect, divine maker - who should have been able to settle things 
once and for all; c. the maker of a material world would need a material 
body - and therefore would be susceptible to the problems suffered by 
material beings, as well as requiring some other maker for that body; d. 
systems which posit a higher, controlling consciousness (such as Vedanta 
and SalTlkhya) fail to explain how this consciousness could relate to a 
changing, finite world. The conclusion for Kumarila, as for all 
MlmalTlsakas who took up this line of argument, is that the idea of a maker 
is complicated, problematic, and unnecessary. Given their lack of interest 
in the project of establishing a Lord, the MimalTlsakas had no interest in 
deciding in favor of the credibility of inductions and other arguments sup-
portive of the existence of a God. l 
The intellectual context for Nyaya and Vedanta, then, is one in which 
there is an impetus toward a theistic reformulation of religion, but also a 
tradition of severe critiques of the plausibility and usefulness of positing 
the existence of God. The challenge to the Naiyayikas such as Jayanta and 
Vedantins such as Vedanta Desika is to formulate positions on God that 
are both intellectually and religiously credible. Let us begin with the 
Nyaya, first by way of some general considerations, and then by way of 
some particular observations on Jayanta Bhatta himself. 
God in Early Nyaya Discourse 
The early discussions of religious topics in the Nyaya school of logic 
were not focused on the question of God; even the oldest Nyaya discussion 
of the topic of God, found in the Nyaya Sutras 4.1.19-21, seems only gradu-
ally and reluctantly to have been turned into a serious theological dis-
course about God by commentators. The question is raised in the midst of 
a longer consideration, in Books 3 and 4 of the Nyaya Sutras, of the set of 
"twelve realities" listed in sutra 1.1.9. The six primary realities (soul, body, 
sense-organs, objects of perception, apprehension, mind) are treated in 
book 3, while in book 4, the six dependent realities (activity, defect, rebirth, 
fruition, pain, release) are examined in detaiJ.2 Nyaya Sutras 4.1.11-43 dis-
cuss the topic of the origins of the six dependent realities. In 4.1.11-13 it 
was determined that manifest things are generated out of other manifest 
things, and then, in 4.1.14-43, eight alternative explanations are considered 
and, it seems, rejected: production from a void (siitras 14-18), or by God 
(siitras 19-21), or due to chance (siitras 22-24); the notions that all things are 
evanescent (sutras 25-28), or eternal (siitras 29-33), or that there is only 
diversity (siitras 34-36), or that nothing exists (siitras 37-40), or that the 
exact number of things can actually be known (siitras 41-43). 
Sutras 19-21 contain a terse argument about whether God is required to 
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ensure the fruitfulness of human action: 
4.1.19 The Lord is the cause, since we see that human action is fruit-
less. 
4.1.20 This is not so since, as a matter of fact, no fruit is accomplished 
without human action. 
4.1.21 Since that is efficacious, the reason lacks force. 
This is the earliest Nyaya treatment of the topic of God; in context, amidst a 
series of proposed reasons which are rejected, the point of the obscure 21st 
sutra is most likely to reject the need for a God who will be the guarantor of 
the efficacy of human activity. If there is no need for a certain kind of 
being, that being should not be introduced, so the suggestion made in 
satra 19 has no force. Since human action can be explained without posit-
ing a Cod, it is better to avoid this postulate; a more common, empirical 
postulate - the contingent arises from the contingent - is sufficient to 
account for reality. Satra 21 can thus be interpreted as a criticism of the 
postulation of theism, as is clearer in this amplified version: 
4.1.21 Since that [action] is efficacious [only due to human effort], 
the reason [put forth in 4.1.19, regarding the need to posit a Lord] 
lacks force. 
But thereafter the situation changes, perhaps due to the need to provide a 
more definitive account of how the perceived world began, and perhaps, 
as we have seen, due to the rise of theism as a central criterion in the devel-
oping Hindu orthodoxy. The Nyaya tradition seems then to change its 
apparent argument against God into a defense of God's existence, as the 
Nyaya commentators took the argument in the theistic direction. Satra 21 
was then interpreted quite differently: 
4.1.21 Since that [human effort] is efficacious [only with divine help]' 
the reason [put forth in 4.1.20, regarding the idea that a Lord is super-
fluous] lacks force. 
To defend the interconnection between the postulation of Cod and the 
practical intelligibility of the world, the Naiyayikas had to develop increas-
ingly complex discussions of Cod's existence, introducing a theistic 
explanatory hypothesis into a system that previously was thought to work 
neatly without such considerations. At first, the goal was less a defense of 
the existence of God than the search for a satisfactory explanation of the 
data of ordinary and empirical experience. But once they had seemingly 
reluctantly entered upon this debate, the Naiyayikas pursued it with great 
vigor, as Jayanta Bhatta's exposition shows. 
The Existence and Nature of God according to Jayanta Bhatta's NyayamaiijarP 
Tra~dition has it that Jayanta Bhatta lived in Kashmir during the reign of 
King Sarp.karavarman, in the 2nd half of the 9th century CE. Jayanta was a 
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well-respected !eacher who, according to one old tradition, suffered perse-
cution under Sal11karavarman, and actually wrote his Nyayamaiijarf 
("Bouquet of Reasoning" or "Bouquet of Nyaya") while in prison! Little 
else is known about Jayanta, and his Nyayamaiijarfhas not received wide 
attention even among Nyaya scholars, in part since it was eclipsed by later, 
ever more systematic works such as Udayana's Nyayakusumaiijali. But in 
the NyayamaiijarI Jayanta offers us an excellent, full exposition of the key 
questions related to God as seen from the Nyaya point of view. Although it 
follows the order of the oldest Nyaya text, the Nyaya Satras, and thus 
resembles a commentary, the individual sections of the Nyayamaiijarf are 
complete treatments of topics selected from the Satras. Part One of the 
NyayamaiijarI considers the means of right knowledge (pramal)a), with an 
emphasis on the nature, kinds, and epistemological value of perception, 
induction, and verbal communication. In this context a range of epistemo-
logical and theological issues are treated. Part Two analyzes both the 
objects of right knowledge (prameya) and also the rhetorical strategies use-
ful in valid argumentation, as well as the flaws in argumentation to be 
avoided. The discussion of whether there is a God (Lord, Isvara)5 is found 
in Part One, in the course of the discussion of the authority underlying ver-
bal - and scriptural - testimony. Jayanta adheres to a realist view of the 
world and a theological view which allows for definite, reasoned state-
ments about God. The world is real but finite, so it requires some explana-
tion; God is knowable at least insofar as he is the world-cause; upon con-
sideration, some further attributes are necessarily included in this minimal 
definition of God as world-maker. 
Jayanta begins his discussion of the existence of God by listing a series 
of objections to the theistic position, which can be summarized as ten: i. 
God cannot be perceived; ii. therefore, God cannot be known based on a 
specific or general inference drawn from something perceived;6 iii. the 
earth is not "something made," an effect; iv. there is no need to postulate a 
maker beyond all the various causes; v. a maker must have a body, and so 
would suffer the various limitations that bodies impose; vi. it cannot be 
shown that there is just one maker; vii. it is not possible to imagine a pur-
pose for God's making the world; if God has made this unhappy world 
simply because he wanted to, he is cruel, and beings are subject to divine 
whims; viii. if there is a determining divine will which is not subordinate 
to rules, the merits and demerits of beings will not necessarily matter (as 
they would if reward and punishment were a matter only of cause and 
effect), and even liberation might not be permanent since this God could 
reverse it; ix. just as perception and ind uction therefore do not work, so too 
other possible sources of authoritative knowledge (e.g., verbal testimony 
[sabdal and comparison [upamana]), do not succeed in making known the 
existence of God; x. popular beliefs are surely no basis on which to claim 
certainty regarding God's existence.7 Except for the first and the last, these 
arguments are aimed at problematizing induction and undercutting the 
likelihood of drawing any definite conclusions about God by induction. Vii 
and viii mark special problems on the basis of which the fact of a God 
known by induction would lead to new and difficult questions, and most 
of Jayanta's defense is aimed at showing that induction does work. 
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When Jayanta takes up and systematizes the Nyaya argumentation 
about God in the third part of the Nyayamaiijarl - the section on verbal 
knowledge - he mentions three opposing groups by name: the mat~rialists 
(Carvakas), the ritual theorists (Mlmarnsakas), and the Buddhists (Sakyas). 
According to Jayanta, the materialist goal is to undercut the Veda by deny-
ing that it is eternal and by positing instead that it has merely human 
authors, while yet also arging that the world, though finite, has no maker. 
Like other scholars who mention the materialists, Jayanta deals with them 
only briefly. He charges them with inconsistency: either the Veda and the 
world both have agents behind them (as Nyaya prefers), or neither does; if 
the Veda has an author, then so too the world should have a maker. 
The second group of Jayanta's named opponents are the Mlmarnsakas 
who, as we have seen, were orthodox ritual theorists. They were vehement 
opponents of both the Carvakas and Buddhists but also, since their system 
requires no God or world-maker, key opponents of the Naiyayikas too. As 
Jayanta presents their position in this context, their quarrel is with the idea 
of establishing the world as an "effect" depending on some particular 
cause. Jayanta rejects their view by arguing that if the world is perishable -
as it evidently is - one must also admit its status as an "effect" in need of a 
cause.' Jayanta rightly recognizes that the challenge posed by the 
Mimarnsakas raises problems similar to those raised by the materialists 
and the Buddhists, though with Mlmarnsa there is the added weight of the 
charge that one need not posit a God even to be a good, orthodox Hindu. 
Third, Jayanta introduces the Buddhists as those who deny that the term 
"effect" ("something made") is appropriately applied to what we observe 
around us. The word "world" is just a label superimposed on the flux of 
reality, without telling us anything important about that reality." Against 
their views Jayanta must argue in favor of the possibility of real reference 
for terms like "world" and "effect," while also presenting a persuasive case 
for identifying causes based on the recognition of effects. 
Against these three opposing perspectives and in response to the ten 
objections listed above, Jayanta's primary challenge is to show how it is 
possible to affirm that there is a God who is the guarantor of the Veda and 
maker of the world. Since the Veda was a universally accepted source of 
knowledge, and since God is not actually perceived, neither perception nor 
a specific induction from perception proves anything. If God is to be 
known, then, God's existence has to be established by a more general 
induction, based on noticing the pattern of things as they usually occur 
and on making a judgment about a particular case which exemplifies a 
general rule. Thus, "things that are temporary are things that are made, 
and we can assume that such artifacts have makers." The major part of 
Jayanta's presentation on God is devoted to getting this general induction 
straight and establishing that it does afford certain knowledge that there is 
a God. Since the world is ever changing and evidently not permanent, it 
requires a maker with the proper characteristics, and this maker we name 
"God." Jayanta likewise aims at warding off proposed counterexamples 
which would undercut the induction by showing that "making the world" 
and "being maker of the world" are not like "making a pot" or "being a 
pot-maker, potter." 
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Much of the debate proceeds according to a lively sense of the relative 
weakness and strengths of particular inductions, the possibility of excep-
tions and alternate explanations. He says that if an induction is strength-
ened by pointing to analogies with other inductions that are not controver-
sial, the adduced analogous cases do not have to be exact. Smoke on a hill 
usually indicates a fire, but not always; a clay pot is obviously made by the 
potter, but one cannot say that everything made of day has a maker. Thus, 
an ant-hill is made of day, but there is no single maker for the hill, rather 
only the contributing actions of many ants. Some things, even if finite, have 
no evident makers; no one argues that the generation of a sprout from a 
seed is caused by an intervening maker. So too, some very large things, 
such as mountains, ought not to be counted as "made" in the same sense 
that pots are made. The claim that the world is made is itself controversial, 
since "world" is not a dearly named single referent known from experi-
ence in the way "pot" is known. 
At the heart of Jayanta's response is his insistence that, variables not with-
standing, induction remains epistemically informative. Of course, no 
observed event - e.g., the production of an effect - is identical to another, 
and questions inevitably arise about the appropriateness of any particular 
induction drawn on an analogy with some other, easier induction. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental plausibility of an induction is undercut only 
if it can be shown that the differences between cases - e.g., between making 
a pot and making the world - are so great as to deprive the novel induction 
of all plausibility. If any observed difference would serve to defeat an induc-
tion, then the very practice of induction would become impossible. While the 
inductively known world-maker is not exactly the same as a pot-maker, 
nothing we learn from the comparison essentially undercuts the idea of a 
world-maker or suggests some other, better way of explaining the world. In 
Jayanta's view, the underlying insight stands firm: the world is something 
made; things that are made require makers; the world has a maker; this 
maker is what we mean when we say there is a God.1O 
Specifically, then, his responses to the ten criticisms of explanatory the-
ism (stated above) are as follows: 
i. Criticism: God cannot be perceived; response: true, God cannot be per-
ceived; 
ii. Criticism: therefore, God cannot be inferred based on perception; 
response: it is true that God cannot be inferred specifically on the 
basis of some specific perception, but God can be inferred on a 
more general basis; 
iii. Criticism: the earth is not "something made;" response: materialists, 
MImaqlsakas, and Buddhists all agree, in other contexts, that 
things are impermanent; but things that are impermanent are 
made - by some maker; 
iv. Criticism: there is no need to postulate a maker beyond all the various 
causes; response: whatever the various causes, there still must be 
an intelligent maker; 
v. Criticism: a maker must have a body, and so would suffer the various lim-
itations that bodies impose; response: there is no need to infer an 
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embodied maker; we can say that God makes though not embod-
ied, just as the self guides the body without being embodied; 
vi. Criticism: it cannot be shown that there is just one maker; response: a 
hypothesis asserting that there is more than one God would be 
confusing, since these 'Gods' would be in competition, etc.; 
vii. Criticism: it is not possible to imagine a purpose for God's making the 
world; response: he makes out of compassion, or out of divine play; 
viii. Criticism: the merits and demerits of beings may no longer matter, and 
liberation mayor may not be permanent; response: none of this is a 
problem, since the integrity of the working of dharma can be 
coherently shown to depend on the work of God; 
ix. Criticism: just as perception and induction therefore do not work, there 
are no other authoritative means of knowledge; [apparent response: 
induction does work and does suffice]. 
x. Criticism: popular beliefs are surely no basis on which to claim certainty 
regarding God's existence; [apparent response: this is true).!' 
Like other Naiyayikas, Jayanta thinks that observation of the world, and 
the requirement that one explain the origins of the world, are legitimate 
starting points for an inferential knowledge of God. The defense of the via-
bility of inference - induction - is also a defense of a fundamental analo-
gous knowledge of God. This knowledge is minimal but, as we shall see in 
the next section, indicative of certain claims about the nature of God. 
The Nature of God according to the Nyayamaiijan 
Although the argumentative context of the debate with atheists does not 
require Jayanta to develop ideas on the nature of God - that God exists suf-
fices - nevertheless certain claims about the divine nature are implicit in the 
argument about God's existence. 12 First, the induction of a world-maker 
entails a minimal list of qualities which are essential to any maker (kartr): 
intelligence (jiiana), because he must know what is available and how to use 
it; will (iccha), because he must have an intention regarding what is to be 
done; and effort (prayatna), the ability to act, since the making of things 
requires the effort to bring them about. In the course of discussion these 
three minimal qualities are shown to be unlimited perfections in the special 
case of the world-maker, since it is clear that no ordinary maker would be 
capable of making the world. God is omniscient and possessed of a compre-
hensive and eternally present knowledge, and thus does not need the appa-
ratus of memory. As the world-maker, God must have unrestricted knowl-
edge and power; he cannot have a body, since bodies, as material, are 
impermanent, limited, and in need of makers. One can also posit that this 
God is never in want and is always satisfied, because he is omnipotent and 
always succeeds in whatever he intends and undertakes. It also follows, 
Jayanta says, that there can only be one such God, since it would not be pos-
sible for there to be several- potentially competing - omnipotent Lords. 
Second, once Jayanta has (to his own satisfaction) shown that it is plausi-
ble to infer that there is a God who is the maker of the world, he must also 
show that it is plausible to claim that this divine maker is the maker of the 
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world in which humans actually live - a world that is temporal, contin-
gent, imperfect, a mixture of sadness and joy. He argues against the view 
that a perfect maker should have made a perfect world without the possibil-
ity of development or decay, by suggesting that there is an important dis-
tinction between God's inherent perfection and God's guidance of finite 
objects in an imperfect, changing worldY Since God is free and not impelled 
to act out of need, when he does act he acts in play, or out of compassion. 
Jayanta also addresses objections related to the expectation that the mer-
its and demerits of conscious beings - karma - form the only reliable 
basis on which to account for the world morally, so that an appeal to a 
deity would interfere with religious and moral probity.14 This issue also 
arises in Vedanta, for there too the omnipotence of God has to be balanced 
with a respect for the invariable advance of the karmic process. In both 
Nyaya and Vedanta the solution is similar, as the moral order is simply 
designated to function as in the older non-theistic tradition, but now 
dependent on God's will. This is a divine choice which indicates neither 
divine subordination to a higher law nor capricious disregard for karma. 
Third, Jayanta's argument in favor of God's existence is part of his wider 
quest to establish and defend the authority of the Veda in the context of 
broader cosmic intelligibility. After he has established the induction in the 
3rd part of the NyayamaiijarI and thus determined that there is a God who 
can be the author of the Veda, in the 4th part he goes on to discount compet-
ing rationales in explanation of the authority of the Veda, and states that the 
same Lord who is the maker of the world is also the author of the Veda. 
This is known by much the same inferential reasons: words and combina-
tions of words are impermanent and require some maker who synthesizes 
them and makes them reliable tools for coherent speech. It also makes no 
sense merely to postulate that the world has one maker while the Veda has 
another maker, nor to suggest that there are numerous makers all working 
in harmony composing the Veda. It is more economical to say that both the 
world and the Veda are made by the same maker, the Lord.15 
Fourth, since Jayanta recognizes the authority of the Veda but does not 
claim that it is the only basis for deciding that there is a God, he denies that it 
is a circular argument to claim that God is the author of the Veda and that 
the Veda gives reliable information about God. Those who admit the reason-
ability of the theistic position and the reasonability of the idea of an authori-
tative textual tradition expect to find in the Vedic scriptures reinforcement 
for what is kllOwn about God rationally. In accordance with his religious 
"realism" and view that there is a God who is real (and really "outside" the 
text), Jayanta disagrees with the Mlmarpsa view that the Vedas only give 
information leading to the proper performance of rituals; rather, the Veda 
also gives reliable information on various topics, including God.16 
Fifth, if we can j~dge from the clues Jayanta giyes us, it seems that he is 
an adherent of the Saiva tradition of devotion to Siva as supreme Lord. At 
the beginning of the NyayamapjarI ~e makes a customary obeisance to 
God - and addresses God as Siva (Sambhu, Bhava), along with his con-
sort Parvau, and Ganesa (usually taken as their child): 
Salutations to Sambhu, the self composed of eternal bliss, conscious-
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ness and lordship, who by his simple intent creates everything from 
the inanimate to Brahma [the creator god]; 
I bow down to the wife of Bhava whose hair is adorned bv the cres-
cent of the moon and who is verily the river of nectar, the ';xtinguish-
er of the burning due to existence, 
I tender my salutation to the lord of hosts Ganesa whose feet are illu-
mined by the rays of the jewels on the foreheads of gods and 
demons, and who is the sun removing the darkness of obstacles. 17 
At the end of his defense of theism in part 3 of the Nyiiyamafijarihe says, 
Reverence to the one by whose will alone the worlds arise and 
endure and dissolve at the end of the age, who distributes among all 
creatures the experie~ce of the fruits of their actions, who is eternally 
awake and joyful- Siva. 1B 
It is thus reasonable to assume that Jayanta belongs to a Saiva tradition, 
even if the bulk of the Nyayamafijari is neutral with respect to sectarian 
affiliation and potentially inclusive of a variety of sectarian positions. His 
logical analysis contributes to piety by undergirding the plausibility of 
faith and by ruling out competing theories of the nature of the world or 
religious traditions. In his system faith and reason are independent but 
mutually supportive, reaching compatible, complementary conclusions. 
Sixth, an interesting corollary of the preceding two points is that the sev-
eral Vedas and various traditional texts are therefore recognized to be in 
harmony, except if there is some reason which compels one to rule out a 
particular sectarian text as unacceptable. As in other orthodox schools, most 
notably MnnaIpsa, the criteria for acceptance or rejection pertain primarily 
to orthopraxis or, at least, to whether or not a tradition is inimical to Vedic 
orthopraxis. Traditions are not excluded on the basis of wrong ideas or the-
ories about the nature of God but in terms of the behavior that accompanies 
the ideas. According to Jayanta's explanation, the behavior at issue is social 
and moral. Although Buddhist texts are excluded from the canon of those 
which merit respect, the exclusion is argued not on doctrinal grounds but 
due to practical moral complaints against Buddhists. In general, Jayanta's 
Nyaya is strikingly inclusive: agreeing that there is a God does not commit 
one to a particular naming of God nor to some particular form of worship. 
Further specifications of the divine identity cannot be achieved by reason-
ing alone. But as we shall now see, although Vedanta too adheres to a view 
of God that is founded in reason and in scripture, the dynamics of this 
knowledge of God work out differently there and distinctions arise. 
The Existence and Nature of God in Vedanta Desika's Nyliyasiddhaiijana 19 
In regard to the doctrine of God, the most notable ally and competitor of 
Nyaya in the Sanskrit language traditions are the theistic schools of 
Vedanta.2o Vedanta Desika (1268-1369) was an important theologian of the 
Visif?tadvaita. This school of Vedanta roots its theology in the teachings of 
the 11th century theologian Ramanuja, whose theology is in turn explicitly 
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rooted in the Upani~ads, the Bhagavad Gfta, the Uttara MImaIJIsa Sutras, 
etc., and implicitly in the Tamil-language devotional songs of the 7th-9th 
century saints known as the alvars. Ramanuja's Vedanta is known as the 
Visi~tadvaita or uQualified-Nondualist" Vedanta since, unlike the strict 
nondualist position of the Advaita (UNondualist") School, it insisted on the 
distinct and enduring reality of sentient and insentient beings within 
Brahman, the Lord. 
Vedanta Desika was born in the town of Tuppil, near Conjeevaram 
(today's Kanchipuram) which was a great center of learning for several 
religious traditions. Writing in Sanskrit, Tamil, and a mixture of the two, 
and composing independe~t treatises, commentaries, and songs, Desika 
expounded the faith of the Srivai~r:tavas, that there is o~e ultimate reality, 
who is the Lord Narayar:ta (Vif?r:tu)21 with the Goddess Sri, and who at the 
same time is Brahman, the Reality described in the ancient Upani~ads. 
Two of Desika's treatises, the Nyayaparisuddhi (The Purifying of 
Reasoning, 1324) and Nyayasiddhaiijana (The Healing of Reasoning; 1334-5), 
together comprise a thorough defense of the Visi~tadvaita system of 
Vedanta according to the norms of a rational discourse he shared with the 
Naiyayikas. In the Nyayaparisuddhi, Vedanta Desika takes up the topics 
of the Nyaya Sutras and discusses four primary means of correct knowl-
edge (pramaIJa): perception (pratyak?a), induction (anumana), verbal 
knowledge (sabda), and tradition (smrtl). 
The Nyayasiddhaiijana builds on the corrective work of the 
Nyayaparisuddhi by focusing on the objects of right knowledge (prameya) 
and considering seven topics: i. inert material reality (jac;la dravya); ii. the 
individual, dependent self (jIva); iii. the supreme Lord (Isvara); iv. the eter-
nal spiritual/material abode of the Lord (vaikuIJtha); v. understanding 
(buddhl); vi. that knowledge which is essential to conscious beings and not 
adventitious (dharmabhutajiiana); vii. qualities, which are real but not 
material (adravya).22 Our examination of DeSika's work will highlight two 
points: first, the rationale for and implications of his (and Vedanta's gener-
al) objection to the induction of God's existence, and second, his descrip-
tion of God compared and contrasted with Jayanta's.23 
The Existence of God According to the U lsvarapariccheda" Section of 
Vedanta Desika's Nyayasiddhaiijana 
Desika offers an explanation of his position about God in the third sec-
tion of the Nyi:Jyasiddhaiijana, a section entitled "I§varapariccheda" 
("Delimiting the meaning of 'Lord'.") In the "I§varapariccheda" Desika 
sets forth his understanding that there is a single such reality, who is 
Narayar:ta, the God of his particular tradition (and some allied traditions); 
he defends this view against a series of opposing positions introduced by 
way of various objections. 
The "Isvarapariccheda" is argumentative, devoted to a defense of the 
common but controverted Vedanta positions about the nature of Brahman, 
the self, and the world as a single integral reality, and also a defense of 
specifically Visi~tadvaita Vedanta themes regarding the nature of Vi~r:tu, 
the Lord (= Brahman). Desika is aware that all these points are argued at 
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length both inside and beyond Vedanta circles, and he defends them vigor-
ously. Most of these points bear philosophical defense even if, like other 
Vedanta theologians, Desika's primary strategy is to insist that the truth of 
the Vedic scriptures must be acknowledged first; scripture is the only 
source of sure knowledge about God, since the arguments put forward by 
the Naiyayikas and others must remain always controverted and can never 
provide the required certainty. The Buddhists and Mimarytsakas are right 
in questioning the induction, but they are wrong in discarding the idea of 
God on that basis. TIle Naiyayikas are right in asserting that there is a God, 
but they are wrong in arguing that an induction can make it known with 
certainty that God exists.24 Here is a summary paraphrase of the major 
points defended in the "Isvarapariccheda:" 
i. the Lord is everywhere perfect and complete, and not subject to 
restrictions such as would specify him mythologically as one of a 
series of deities, each possessed of some but not all lordly qualities; 
ii. contrary to the view of the Nondualist Vedantins, Brahman (i.e., 
the Lord) is not devoid of qualities that can be expressed in posi-
tive language; 
111. the material evolute (prime matter) is not merely superimposed 
on Brahman in a seeming creative interchange, as some 
Nondualists hold in hopes of defending Brahman's changeless 
perfection; , 
IV. the nondualist position held by Sarpkara and others is not com-
patible with the position that Brahman is the material source of 
the world; 
v. it is not tenable to say that Brahman and the world are both dif-
ferent and non-different, as some Vedantins hold; 
vi. the sevenfold position of the Jainas is linguistically complicated 
and subtle, but it does not tell us anything decisive about the 
nature of the reality to which language refers, a reality which has 
objective, definite features; 
vii. Brahman is not limited by space, time, or things; 
viii. it cannot be proven by in4uction that Brahman is the efficient 
cause of the world, as the Saivas hold, while holding in suspen-
sion the question of whether Brahman is also its material cause; 
ix. contrary to the Nyaya view, it cannot be proven by induction even 
that the Lord exists (as the necessary efficient cause of the world); 
x. The ~ord is eternally accompanied by his eternal divine con-
sort, Sri:. 
Desika had two major disagreements with the Naiyayikas, one suggested 
indirectly by iv and viii, and the other directly, by ix. First, a? we see in his 
argument against the Nondualists at iv. and against the Saivas at viii., 
Desika did believe that God was the material as well as instrumental cause 
of the world, and agreed with the Nondualist Vedantins on this; but 
Desika thought that the Nondualists could not properly defend the distinc-
tions. required to invest "making" with meaning; he likewise thought that 
the Saivas and Naiyayikas were both wrong in attributing only efficient 
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causality to God without also accepting God's material causality (which is 
known from the Upanif?ads). 
The argument with Nyaya is positioned as subordinate to the debate 
about induction. As we see at ix., Desika denies that a necessary divine 
causal function, and therefore the divine existence too, can be known con-
clusively by reasoning. While Jayanta and other Naiyayikas thought that 
the Lord's existence - as the required efficient cause could be inductively 
known, Desika believed that divine causality - simultaneously efficient 
and material - could be known only as a single efficient and material 
causality. In order to begin with the belief that God is both the material and 
efficient cause, Desika has to undercut the confidence that reasoning, prior 
to faith in the Vedic scriptures, gives certain knowledge about God. 
Consequently too, he rejects the view that it is reasonable, apart from scrip-
ture, to assert that God is the efficient cause of the world. 
Desika's critique of the Nyaya induction about God's existence is direct-
ed against the later Naiyayika, Udayana, whom he quotes, but the basic 
charges are pertinent to Jayanta's position too. 25 For the most part, his 
skepticism echoes the earlier Mlmarpsa criticisms mentioned earlier in this 
essay. Observation of the nature of the world does not lead to a convincing 
induction that there is a world-maker, since a limited and ever-changing 
world does not give the impression that it has an omniscient and omnipo-
tent maker as its efficient cause. A perfect God would make a flawless and 
perfectly complete world, not the imperfect and gradually evolving world 
we actually observe. Nor is it possible to describe just how this alleged per-
fect maker is supposed to have made the world; were he unlimited in 
every way, he would not have the specific and limited knowledge, desire, 
and effort required to make this specific world. 
Even if one agrees with the Nyaya thinkers that the earth has a cause 
because it is clearly something made, one cannot jump to the conclusion 
that there is a single maker. There are plausible alternative explanations for 
the evolution of non-conscious realities - e.g., simply a series of causes -
which serve just as well to satisfy the mind, so one is not compelled to con-
clude that any particular created thing - especially "world" - must depend 
on one conscious maker. Even if one were to postulate that things which are 
made must have not only causes but also makers, this generalization leaves 
one without any specific insight into the nature of a particular world-maker. 
It would not even be possible to prove that the maker has perfect knowl-
edge, since even a non-omniscient person, or group of such persons, could 
have fashioned so imperfect a world. The only maker the Naiyayikas could 
succeed in proving would be one with a body, since the physical world 
would be most plausibly explained as made by a physical maker - for 
where are there other examples of makers without bodies making material 
things? Ultimately, there is no satisfactory way to prove both that this phys-
ical universe has a maker who does not have a physical body, and it is only 
by a kind of wishful thinking that the Naiyayikas end up with the perfect 
maker they argue for. So induction gives no reliable knowledge about God. 
One can only speculate on the Nyaya response to Desika's arguments. 
Since both the Nyaya and Vedanta thinkers are theists who agree substan-
tially about the nature of God (see below), there is no urgency on the 
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Nyaya part to respond to Vedanta in particular. The non-theistic 
Mlmal11sakas and Buddhists receive the brunt of the Nyaya attacks, but 
certainly many of the same arguments would serve well in response to 
yedanta skeptics too. Moreover, if we keep in mind the consonance of 
Saiva and Nyaya positions, one can speculate that the Nyaya response 
would be to show first that the induction does work, and second that faith 
in Siva and trust in reasoning can go together. For a Naiyayika, it is useful 
and in keeping with scripture to conclude by reason that there is a God 
who is the efficient cause of the world, even if from other sources (such as 
scripture) one will want to fill in the portrait of God later on. 
The Nature of God according to the Nyayasiddhanjana 
In arguing against Nondualists, Buddhists and Jains, and against 
other theists who think of God differently (holding for instance that God 
is the efficient cause but not the material cause of the world) Desika is 
implicitly giving us a great deal of information about this God who is 
the source of all, who is perfect, omniscient, the spiritual source of all 
things material and spiritual, etc. At the beginning of the "Isvara-
pariccheda," though, he explicitly identifies eight features of "Lord:" i. 
The Lord is ruler over all; ii. he is conscious and all-pervasive in know-
ing; iii. everything is totally dependent upon him; iv. he is propitiated by 
all religious actions and gives all the fruits [accruing to worship]; v. he is 
the foundation for everything; vi. he is the generator of all things that 
are made; vii. he has all things, other than his own knowledge and own 
self, as his body; viii. all that he wishes comes true, due simply to him-
self. The presupposition seems to be that a being deserving the name 
"Lord" must be possessed of these eight features. 26 Although this list 
may be original to Desika, each of the eight features is familiar from the 
older Visi:;;tadvaita Vedanta understanding of God, already in 
Ramanuja's works, and they can be traced to the Upani:;;ads. The fea-
tures are not fully explained in the "Isvarapariccheda," although their 
reasonableness is presupposed. 
The list can be filled out a bit by brief further reflection on the doctri-
nal implications of Desika's arguments with his opponents in the body of 
the "Isvarapariccheda:" God is perfect, complete, one Lord, beyond sec-
tarian distinctions such as the trinity of Brahma, Vi:;;DU, and Siva; he is the 
aU-encompassing reality who bears all as his own body, yet both con-
scious and non-conscious realities remain distinct within him; he is the 
material and efficient cause of the world; although beyond human com-
prehension, language is not entirely useless regarding him, and he can, be 
spoken of in positive terms; his eternal consort is the Goddess Sri, 
Lak:;;ml. In most of these statements, Desika is echoing the beliefs of his 
Srlvai:;;Dava community, beliefs elaborated elsewhere in Sanskrit and 
Tamil sources. What is distinctive in the Nyayasiddhanjana is the terse, 
logical form in which such positions are put forward as defensible on rea-
sonable grounds and as superior, similarly on reasonable grounds, to 
competing views. 
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Confessing Vi$l.1U as the One True God 
In practice, Desika shares a common theistic and even monotheistic 
worldview with the Naiyayikas. He agrees with Jayanta that there is one 
Lord, a perfect, omniscient being who is the cause of the world, author of the 
Vedas, giver of liberation. As we have seen, though, they disagree on the 
source of this correct knowledge. For the same reason, Desika is also more 
vehemently sectarian than Jayanta who seemed comfortable with the impli-
cation that there is a God whose reasonably identified features should be 
agreeable to all thinking theists. By contrast, Desika is intent on arguing for a 
specific identification of who God is. The first and last of Desika's major 
assertions in the "lsvarapariccheda" (after his definition of "Lord") test the 
boundary between what is accessible to reason and what is known only by 
faith. In the first section, Desika claims that it is true that NarayaDa alone is 
the Lord, and not any other sectari~ god; in the last, he states that the Lord 
is eternally one ,,\,ith his consort, SrI, who is equal to him, and the world 
depends on both SrI and NarayaDa, together. Even in the NyayasiddMiijana, 
so reasonable a treatise, such arguments are sectarian in a way that the 
Nyaya argwnents generally are not; the assertions reg~rding Vi~l!U go well 
beyond the claims Jayanta is willing to make regarding Siva. 
It will not be surprising to learn that Desika offers a less inclusive view 
of the texts and traditions of other communities than does Jayanta. In the 
Nyayaparisuddhi, the companion volume to the Nyayasiddhaiijana, 
Desika engages in a discussion of traditions and texts (agamabhJ$c1, 
smrtyabha$a) which do not deserve the respect of full authority. He lists 
kinds of defective traditions, as marred with lesser or greater moral and 
intellectual defects. It is only the important Vai$Dava texts, of course, which 
are free of these defects - and therefore only they are truly authoritative in 
their teachings on God and the world.27 Jayanta was willing to respect tra-
ditions insofar as they contributed to right moral practice, even if his stan-
dard was flexible enough to allow him to exclude the Buddhists, while 
downplaying sectarian rivalries among Hindus. Desika ,makes no such 
allowances, and calls into question the authority even of Saiva texts; texts 
which do not testify to the correct scriptural positions can be shown to be 
rationally and even "genealogically" deficient. 
Theology and Theologies, Hindu and Comparative 
Jayanta Bhatta and Vedanta Desika have much in common regarding 
the major characteristics of their portrayals of God, even if they reach this 
common ground from opposite directions. Jayanta BhaHa derives his theol-
ogy, insofar as it is an intellectual project, from an original, minimal claim 
that it can be known by induction that God exists; Vedanta Desika sees the-
ology first of all as a reasoned elaboration of what is found in the scrip-
tures. As we have seen, on occasion Jayanta Bhatta the logician is comfort-
able with citing the Upani~ads, and Vedanta Desika the exegete is a master 
of dialectic. In most respects their theological conclusions are the same: 
God is ruler over all; he is conscious and all-pervasive in knowing; he has 
everything totally dependent on himself; he is propitiated by all religious 
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actions and gives all the fruits [of worship]; he is the foundation for all 
things; he is the generator of all things that are made; he has all things, 
other than his own knowledge and own self as his body; all that he wishes 
comes true, due simply to himself. The differences reduce largely to one 
important difference regarding the nature of the dependence of the world 
on God: since Jayanta does not hold the Vedanta view that God is the 
world's material cause, he therefore interprets differently the nature of the 
dependence of finite realities on God. 
In turn, the difference about causality is presented primarily as having 
to do with the sources of knowledge of God and how faith and reasoning 
are to be ordered and balanced. The argumentation that has been traced 
here in Jayanta Bhatta and Vedanta Desika, with some attention to other 
Hindu and Buddhist positions, illumines the sources of knowledge of God 
- perception (which both deny), induction (which Jayanta accepts), and 
scriptural revelation (which Desika makes the unique source, and which 
Jayanta accepts as a source) - and differences regarding what can be 
known about God by reason, before revelation, and regarding what might 
be known in a "public" discourse not tied to any particular sectarian reve-
lation, and instead as available to all reasoning persons. 
Jayanta's position allows for a series of (imperfect) analogies with other 
acts of making things and things coming into existence or changing form; 
observation of the world as such should give people some idea of the need-
ed maker. Knowledge of God, it seems he would agree, is not entirely 
unlike other acts of knowledge, regarding either the object or the process. 
Desika seems more inclined to say that we will not "read" our world cor-
rectly, and must begin to know God properly by relying on an extraordi-
nary act of revelation. Implicit in his view is that if one begins otherwise, 
one can at best do as the Naiyayikas do, but more likely will fall into the 
errors of Buddhism, Jainism, and nondual Vedanta. Both Desika and 
Jayanta are willing to argue with a whole range of opponents, but Desika, 
in the "Isvarapariccheda" and other such texts, adopts a kind of defensive 
strategy; since he concedes from the start that he cannot prove to unbeliev-
ers what he believes, his point is in part that his opponents cannot prove 
their views, nor disprove his, nor show that their positions are more satis-
factory than his. Beyond that, he must make a confessional appeal. Jayanta 
too is not willing to tolerate extreme positions, such as those of atheists, but 
he dismisses these on moral grounds. Likewise, he gives no indication of 
expec!ing all good and clear-thinking readers to come to embrace specifi-
cally Saiva beliefs. 
Jayanta benignly seeks a wide common ground; there is one God who is 
the author of all the sacred texts, and these many texts, even if they differ, 
can all be acceptable to good people. Desika is willing to concede inklings 
of truth in other positions, but ultimately he sees only his own tradition as 
possessed of the full and fully coherent version of the truth, and thus has 
no room for the idea of a broader common ground in which sectarian truth 
issues are simply bracketed. 
Theirs are developed theological positions which can be compared in 
both structure and content with those of Christian theologians. Noticing 
this offers us an opportunity to consider how rational claims about the 
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existence of God, along with the minimal set of characteristics which must 
be attributed to a world-maker, can further be traced in their affiliations to 
the faith, piety, and practices of particular communities. Issues which have 
been debated at great length in the Western and Christian contexts - the 
proof of God's existence, what can be known about God's nature by rea-
son, the balance between reason and revelation, the benefits and costs of 
establishing a rational, common ground for discourse on religious topics-
have interesting and highly developed counterparts in other traditions, 
where they are articulated in frameworks defined by distinguishing factors 
and circumstances.28 Although important differences among religions -
e.g., between the Christian and Hindu traditions - remain, it should also 
be clear that on many issues of theological and philosophical importance 
- pertaining to the nature of induction, the intelligibility of the world, the 
attributes of God, the balance between reason and revelation, etc. - the 
lines of difference cannot be drawn simply between "the Christian 
view(s)" and "the Hindu view(s)," since each issue finds defenders and 
critics on both sides of the Hindu-Christian divide. A more complex theo-
logical differentiation of theologians and their positions is therefore 
required, depending on the particular theological issue involved and how 
any particular Hindu or Christian theologian locates himself or herself in 
regard to that particular issue.29 
Boston College 
NOTES 
1. An interesting later case is the position taken by KharyQadeva (17th cen-
tury CE) in his Bhattad1pika. There, in the course of a very extensive treatment 
of the nature of the Vedic gods, Khal)Qadeva explains at length why these gods 
are not real beings who "live" outside the ritual and textual realm of the Veda; 
but he ends his treatment with an apology, explaining that while it was his task 
as a Mlm,lrpsaka to expound such a view, his real refuge is the feet of Kri?rya. 
See my essay, "What's a God? The Quest for the Right Understanding of 
devat,'i in Brahmanical Ritual Theory (MlmaIJIsa,)" International Journal of 
Hindu Studies 1.2 (August, 1997): 337-385. 
2. As explained in G. Jha's introductory note to Book 4, The Nyaya Satras 
of Gautama with the Bha.!?ya of Vatsyayana and the Vartika of Udyotakara, trans-
lated by G. Jha (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), p. 1429. 
3. The first part only of the Nyayamaiijari, on the means of right knowledge 
(pramaI)a), is available in English translation: Jayanta Bhatta's Nyc'iyamaiijarl 
IThe Compendium of Indian Speculative Logic], translated by Janaki Vallabha 
Bhattacharyya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978). Wherever possible, I have used 
this translation, with minimal adjustments. The Sanskrit edition I have used is 
Nyayamaiijarl, edited with notes by Surya Narayarya Sukla (Varanasi: 
Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1971,2 volumes; Kashi Sanskrit Series 106). 
4. According to J. V. Bhattacharya, in the introduction to his translation of 
the pramaI)a portion of the Nyayamaiijarlinto English. 
5. God - the Lord, Isvara - is treated as male in both Nyaya and 
Vedanta. In their more devotional statements, scholars in both traditions link 
him with a Goddess, his divine consort. 
6. A specific induction would be, for example, the induction that there 
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must be rain clouds, because it is raining; or that it have been raining some-
where upstream, because the water is higher than usual. A general induction 
would be, for example, the induction that a pot requires someone to have 
made it. 
7. These objections can be found on pages 175-17R (Sanskrit), 401-406 
(English) of the NyayaymafljarL 
8. Two citations indicate that Layanta is familiar with the 
Sambandhak$epaparihara section of the SlokaFartika, which we examined 
above. One cited text (Fartika 75) argues that the fact of intelligent involvement 
in the running of the world does not translate into the view that there is a sin-
gle, supreme intelligent world-ruler; the other (vartika 113) dismisses the belief 
that there must be a creation and a destruction of the whole world, as such. 
9. Since the PramaI).avartika is the only Buddhist work which Jayanta 
cites, Dharmaklrti is probably his key Buddhist arguing partner. Jayanta cites 
vartikas 13-14 from the PramaI).asiddhi section, where the question is whether 
the alleged conjunction of parts from which the world is made is really a verbal 
construct (as Dharmaklrti prefers), or in fact a reality from which one might 
construe a real maker of the world, as the Naiyayikas prefer. See Jackson's 
essay elsewhere in this issue. 
10. As for the objection that "something made" (karya) already smuggles 
in the idea of a maker (kartr) as well as cause (ki"iraI).a), Jayanta insists that the 
act of combination is evident, and that the arranger of such a combination is 
indeed a true maker. He implies, it seems, that one can legitimately move to 
the level of abstraction on which "everything" can be labeled all at once as 
impermanent, "something made." 
11. These responses can be found in the Sanskrit text, pp. 178-188, and in 
the English translation, pp. 406-426. There is no explicit response by Jayanta to 
the last two objections; we may preswne that he agrees, without conceding any 
detriment to his own position. 
12. The following six points are gleaned from Jayanta's treatment of God in 
the Clrd section of the NyayamaiijarL which we have been considering, and also 
the 4th section, where the authority of religious traditions is examined. 
13. God's "will per se is eternal because it is not produced by the contact of 
the internal organ with the soul. But it conforms to objects, e.g., at one time the 
creation of the universe and at another time the destruction of the universe. 
During the interval between the creation of the universe and its destruction, 
while the universe persists, the creator of the universe wills that this particular 
effect should follow from this particular action. The [divine] effort is a particu-
lar specification of his intent." (Sanskrit p. 185; translation, p. 421.) 
14. See also, "Evil, Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom: Vedanta's 
Theology of Karma," Journal of Religion 69 (1989),530-548. 
15. See Sanskrit 218-19; translation 496-7. 
16. Jayanta quotes from the Ml11.1~taka, SvetasFatara and Naraya1.la 
Upani$ads, and the Bllagavad Gfta, and argues that these texts confirm what 
he has elaborated in his rationally derived terminology. One interesting corre-
lation, for instance, is his gloss on the Upani!?adic phrase, "the self whose 
desires are true (satyakama), whose intentions are true (satyasarpkalpa), that 
self you should try to discover ... " (Chtindogya 8.7.3); he says, "Desire (kama) 
here means will (iccha), and intent (samkalpa) means effort (prayatna)." I.e., 
the Upani!?adic terms point to the same reality as the terms reasonably derived 
just on the basis of examining what is meant by a "maker." 
17. Sanskrit, p. 1, translation, p. 1. 
18. Sanskrit, p. 188; translation, p. 426. So too, at the end of part 3, he says, 
"Enough of this overly learned talk; this theory of the eternity [of words] must 
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be discarded; those who understand reasoning must accept that words are 
made; since words are made, their maker is the ancient maker, in whose power 
is the fullness of poetic brilliance, and in whose hair is the moon." (Sanskrit, p. 
213, translation, p. 483.) At the very end of the entire work, he says, 
"Reverence to the one whose splendid hair is like the ten million r,ays of the 
moon, who is the wish-filling tree for those who surrender, Sambhu." 
(Sanskrit, vol. 2, p. 208) 
19. The Nyayasiddhaiijalla has not been translated into English. 
Throughout, I use the edition of the Nyayasiddhaiijana which includes the 
Ratllapetika of Sri Kanchi Tatcharya and the Saralavisada of Sri 
Rangaramanuja (Madras: Ubhaya Vedanta Granthamala, 1976). 
20. Though not exclusively: even some writers in the Nondualist Vedanta 
tradition make room for a provisional theism and, in some case, for a theism 
that is sublated only in the final, irreversible unification of all reality. The 16th 
century Advaita Dipika of Nrsiqlhasramin is an excellent example in this 
regard; its third part incorporates close analyses of theistic language, especially 
from the Vai:;;I).ava tradition. 
21. Although the historical sources for: the cults of NarayaI).a and Vi:;;I).u 
would differ, the piety and theology of the Srlvai:;;I).avas identify the two. 
22. The three constituents of reality, lucidity (sattva), passion (rajas), inertia 
(tamas); the five senses, conjunction (salllyoga), and potency (saktl). 
23. Other "Yorks of Desika, such as the Paramatabhanga (The Breaking of 
Other Views), Srimadrahasyatrayasara (The Esst'nce of tlze Three Mysteries), and 
most importantly the Tattvamuktakalapa (The Necklace of Complete Truth), con-
sider the same topics (including the nahlre of the Lord as Ultimate Reality), but 
the focus on logical issues evident in the Nyi'iyaparisuddhi and 
Nyayasiddhaiijana gives this pair of works a clear and systematic shape. 
24. An extended <;ritique of the Nyaya induction of God's existence is 
found in Ramanuja's Sribha~ya, section 1.1.3; for a translation, see The Vedanta 
SOtras with the Commentary of Ramalluja, translated by G. Thibaut, Sacred 
Books of the East, volume 48 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976). 
25. Sanskrit, pp. 325-357. 
26. All things are the Lord's body, because the body and soul relationship 
is the best metaphor or analogy available to understand the mysterious inter-
connection between the Maker, who is both the efficient and material cause of 
the world, and the world itself. To say that all his wishes come true is to affirm 
that the Lord is capable of volition, and it is also to ward off the implication 
that the Lord is subject to desire, or experiences need, or suffers from only par-
tial fulfillment of his wishes, etc. 
27. Nyayaparisuddhi, Sanskrit, pp. 226-229. 
28. But even if these are two very important theologians, their works can-
not be taken as representing the full range of Hindu theological positions. I 
conclude by indicating just two of the ways in which the materials presented 
here need to be complemented. First, of course, the complexities of Nyaya and 
Vi:;;i:;;tadvaita Vedanta deserve fuller treatment, even with respect to the works 
of Jayanta and Desika, and then also with respect to other significant figures in 
each school. Second, even if we stay with systems that are properly theistic 
(and thereby exclude systems such as Mimaqlsa and Advaita Vedanta which 
hold for some transcendent realities or values, but not for a God), there are 
comparable theological systems which deserve attention and which would 
introduce positions l?oth interestingly similar and interestingly different. For 
instance, there is the Saiva Siddhanta tradition, which we looked at briefly, and 
also Madhva's so-called Dualist (Dvaita) Vedanta, which takes one step further 
some of the theistic claims made by Desika. Third, and here too excluding a 
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wide range of materials - in the epics, in poetry, art, etc. - which certainly 
implies specific theologies but does not formulate them as such - special 
attention is due to the Goddess traditions, even in schools such as Vedanta but 
particularly in Tantric traditions, wherein full understandings of the Goddess 
are articulated, though not in the same way, nor with the same standard ques-
tions adopted by both Jayanta and Desika. How Goddess theology is articulat-
ed is a project which is important for a more complete understanding of Hindu 
thinking about the divine. But even those alternative discourses now function 
only in a wider context in which the Nyaya positions and the supporting and 
critical positions of others in response to Nyaya dominate the Hindu discourse 
on God. 
29. On the comparative theological implications of the Nyaya reasoning 
about God, see also my essay, liThe Interreligious Dimension of Reasoning 
about God's Existence," International journal for Philosophy of Religion 46:1-16, 
1999. 
